Introduction
Imagine waking up in a world where physical money has been removed overnight. Cash, cards and even banking as we know it are gone — completely replaced by a new blockchain-based currency, leading the government to lose its control over inflation and banks shutting down. Wolfgang Behringer, a historian of communications, explains that this sudden shift would change the world as we know it and be classified as a revolution (Behringer, 2006). A revolution disrupts fundamental societal structures by impacting the system, economy, relationships and more. Behringer (2006) emphasizes that revolutions are not just upgrades in technology, like switching from desktop computers to laptops, but they completely restructure society, changing the way people think, ethical standards and moral compasses.
Despite this clear definition of what differentiates a revolution from technological upgrades — or in other words, evolution — many people continue to refer to ICT Revolutions as revolutions instead of evolutions. Information and Communication Technologies, or ICT, are the tools that allow for storing, transmitting, and exchanging information. Bill Kovarik, a media historian, describes revolutions as a change in society through the invention of new technologies (Kovarik, 2016). The issue is the mislabelling of evolutions into revolutions, overestimating their impact. This distorts our perception of technological progress and what we expect from it. Words and language in general determine how we see and think about the world. Misusing words can lead to serious distortions in how we reflect on the past, act in the present, and prepare for the future. This misuse is also known as 'deterministic labels', a term explained by Jérôme Bourdon, a scholar of communication history, as the cause for oversimplification of history, leading to a larger issue (Bourdon, 2018). He claims that crediting the societal change to only the technology disregards other societal factors that played a role in this shift. If these so-called ICT Revolutions are not revolutionary and there's more that leads to their impact than just the technology, then was there even a digital revolution in the second half of the twentieth century?
This paper aims to answer the question by comparing the digital revolution with two other ICT revolutions — cross-examining their impacts, analysing the results to understand if any previous ICT Revolution even was a revolution, to ultimately answer the research question, using academic literature to further enhance our understanding of key topics and ideas.
What Counts as a Revolution?
Before cross-examining the other two ICT Revolutions to continue with the analysis, we must first understand what a revolution is and at what point an ICT moment is eligible to be classified as one. This step is crucial, as the goal of this paper is to accurately define ICT Revolutions, to prevent mislabeling that can lead to severe consequences. According to Behringer (2006), a revolution marks a moment in time with rapid, fundamental, and systemic changes of society and its existing structures. Not only a shift, but a complete turn, as seen with the French Revolution. It didn't just introduce new policies or shift the nation's way of thinking, but it eliminated the monarchy, abolishing class hierarchies which had existed for centuries. The French Revolution restructured the nation's political foundation and morality for years to come, not only reforming the country but rupturing it from within. Its impact was so significant that it inspired many other countries and nations in the future (Behringer, 2006).
This example provides three key criteria to identify a true revolution. First is speed — rapid, widespread change is always prominent with revolutions, as laid out by Joel Mokyr, an economic historian (Mokyr, 1990). The Industrial Revolution was not perceived as revolutionary at the time of it happening; Mokyr (1990) explains that historians labeled it as such only years later in retrospect. This already would classify the Industrial Revolution as only an evolution, as it does not adhere to the first criterion of three. The second is societal restructuring, meaning that revolutions fundamentally change political, economic, or cultural foundations of society (Behringer, 2006). The rise of personal computers in the 1980s, which was seen as revolutionary at its time, did not disrupt any existing social hierarchies or systems. Quite the contrary — the computers were integrated into workplaces, schools, and homes, which reinforced existing systems rather than disrupting them, as examined by the scholar of media technology Brian Winston (Winston, 1998). Just like personal computers, many ICT only enhanced existing structures or made them more efficient, but did not cause a rupture, making them ineligible to be called a revolution. Third and final is a universal impact that has to be felt across all levels of society and beyond, transcending geographical and cultural borders (Winston, 1998). The printing press disrupted the monopoly of the Church by democratizing knowledge and making it accessible to more people. It changed the way information was produced and distributed (Kovarik, 2016), clearly adhering to the second criterion. However, this change was not equal amongst all classes of society. Printed material was only accessible to a select few, keeping literacy in the hands of the wealthy and elites. Rural and lower-class communities remained excluded for the most part — concluding that the printing press did not change the world equally amongst all people, but gradually over time (Kovarik, 2016). These guidelines are crucial to differentiate true revolutions from technological upgrades.
Public discourse around revolution and evolution is flawed, limiting itself to two concepts, when in reality there are three. We have moments that upgrade existing technologies: evolutions. Moments which disrupt existing systems: revolutions. However, moments in history that are neither and introduce new innovations are called emergences. Winston (1998) describes an innovation or emergence as something entirely new, entering the world for the first time, like the first human language or the internet itself. The key difference between this, evolution and revolution is that it doesn't build on an existing ICT, but equally also doesn't disrupt any societal systems. Important to note is that Winston (1998) implied that emergence is not enough for revolution, clearly separating the two.
The final misconception, which is key to understanding the broader picture, is the belief that technology alone is responsible for historical and social change, completely independent of social context (Bourdon, 2018). The issue with this fallacy is that it overlooks political, cultural, and economic aspects which influence society, who in turn impact technology. The reason for this is that technology is developed to fill a market gap for consumers to buy, meaning that technology is made for humans. In other words: social forces shape technology and not the other way around, as examined by historians Smith and Marx (Smith & Marx, 1994). If society desires to communicate via brainwaves and technology is advanced enough to create it, developers will start creating this desired product. On the contrary, if new technology is contained by society or institutions like the government, then it can't reach its full potential — meaning that society controls the real impact of new technology by controlling how, or if, they adopt it (Winston, 1998).
The Printing Press
Invented by Gutenberg in the 15th century, the printing press allowed for mass printing of books and literature, making information more accessible. It took the Church's control over information, therefore being labeled as an ICT "Revolution" (Kovarik, 2016). This societal switch enhanced the dissemination of knowledge, giving it revolutionary status. Looking at the revolution assessment framework, it is evident that the printing press does not meet the first criterion. Both Kovarik (2016) and Behringer (2006) explain how the adaptation and societal change was slow, taking decades to spread across the continent. In terms of speed, it is an innovation which grew evolutionary, not revolutionary (Kovarik, 2016). Moving on to the second criterion of societal restructuring, the printing press qualifies for the status of a revolution. At the time of Gutenberg, the Church retained most information, limiting knowledge to ensure power and control for their own benefit. By challenging this monopoly of knowledge, the printing press restructured society and changed the world for many. However, that is exactly where its main issue lies as well (Kovarik, 2016). Only certain parts of society were able to afford printed books, keeping access limited to the elite and clergy (Behringer, 2006). This is part of the reason why the spread of the printing press was so gradual, disqualifying it from the third criterion of universal impact. Ultimately, the printing press had revolutionary influences that slowly spread over time. Benefits were limited to only a select few and the rollout took centuries, restricting it from reaching true revolution status — fulfilling only one of three criteria.
The Electronic Communication Revolution
Although the telegraph and telephone are two individual technologies, they are both part of the same technological era. Kovarik (2016) defines this era as the first electronic communication revolution. The telegraph was adopted quickly by governments, militaries, and businesses. Similar to the printing press however, the access was limited to only institutional actors (Czitrom, 1982). This was because the telegraph was developed for military purposes, allowing the army to communicate strategically — serving as another example of how the circumstances of society shape technology and not the other way around (Kovarik, 2016). The telephone was adopted much slower than its counterpart, as the infrastructure to support its use was expensive and investment needed time. Like its predecessor, the spread of its adoption was uneven between countries (Kovarik, 2016). This means that both technologies qualify partially for the first criterion, as they were adopted quickly, but only by institutions.
Moving on to the second criterion: the telegraph enhanced the speed and distance of communication, allowing for real-time news. Although helpful, it did not radically change how people communicated — it was essentially a quicker version of the postal system, not a rupture (Kovarik, 2016). The telephone is like the successor to the telegraph, building directly on top of its pre-existing system. It upgraded communication from text to voice, but did not revolutionarily change the structure, access, or function of communication itself. The contrary is true, as it reinforced the existing system by allowing people who already used technology to communicate better; but those excluded remained excluded (Kovarik, 2016). Following the revolution assessment framework, both technologies do not qualify to meet the second criterion. As already mentioned, the access of both technologies was limited to institutions, businesses, or the elites. Global adoption was not immediate or universal, taking many decades to spread (Behringer, 2006), disqualifying both from meeting the third criterion. Even today no revolution or evolution ever reached true global status. The digital divide describes the unequal access to technologies through geography, income, or infrastructure. Natural global inequality prevents many people from accessing certain technologies, restricting ICT Revolutions from reaching universal status. Examining the telegraph and telephone through the revolution assessment framework uncovered that neither qualifies for a true revolution — only accelerating pre-existing structures but never changing anything fundamental in a revolutionary way.
The Digital Revolution in Comparison
After clarifying what it means to be a revolution and analyzing multiple previous ICT revolutions, the digital revolution remains unexamined. In order to understand if there truly was a digital revolution in the second half of the twentieth century, it is crucial to cross-examine it with the previously mentioned evolutions, using the revolution assessment framework. The digital revolution began in the second half of the twentieth century and refers to the shift from analog and mechanical technologies to digital computational technologies. Bringing about the mass adoption of computers, the internet, and smartphones, the digital revolution introduced the Information Age, changing how people receive information, work, communicate, learn, and interact with the world (Kovarik, 2016). Kovarik (2016) states that it is commonly referred to as the fourth major communication shift in human history.
This paper takes a critical perspective, asking if the digital revolution really revolutionised the world or only enhanced already existing systems like its predecessors. As many academics like Wolfgang Behringer suggest, revolutions have to happen rapidly for everyone (Behringer, 2006). Examining the history of the digital revolution reveals that computers and the internet were invented in the mid twentieth century, while their adoption happened decades later in the 1990s to 2000s. It was faster than the printing press, which took centuries; however it is very similar to the telegraph and telephone, being only available to a select few in the beginning.
A revolution earns its title when society feels a revolutionary effect — not when the technology is created, but when its consequences reach society.
The digital revolution was quick in innovation but slow in adaptation, and therefore the effect needed time to reach everyone, leading it to be disqualified as a revolution in terms of speed (Winston, 1998; Kovarik, 2016).
A revolution, like the French Revolution, disrupts societal systems and does not reinforce them. Digital tools however, did just that — changing communication and work but not the structure of society, like changing capitalism or inequality (Winston, 1998). It empowered Big Tech, reinforcing existing hierarchies through enhanced surveillance or new tools (Czitrom, 1982). The digital revolution is not like the printing press, which ideologically restructured society by challenging the Church. It is more like the telegraph or telephone, integrating itself into existing corporate systems. It is important to note that information dissemination changed through the access of social media and constant connection; however these changes are functional, not structural (Hirst, 2012). The digital revolution only altered how we communicate, not who controls communication (Bourdon, 2018) — keeping control in the hands of the powerful, partially fulfilling criterion two of the revolution assessment framework.
Previous analysis already uncovered that the digital divide is ongoing. Billions of people remain excluded because of geography, income, or education, keeping ICT revolutions from affecting the whole world. Similarly to the printing press, the digital revolution failed to reach society on a global level (Hirst, 2012) — staying western-focused, preventing it from being labelled as a true revolution in terms of universal impact.
To conclude, the digital revolution was quick in innovation, but too slow for the masses. Its restructuring abilities were limited, as it only changed the function of communication, not the control of communication. After examination, the digital revolution is disqualified for criteria one and three of the revolution assessment framework and only partially qualified for criterion two. It enhanced technology and reinforced existing systems, leading to it being more of an evolution than revolution. Similar to other ICT 'revolutions' before, the digital revolution brought change — but it was contained, unequal, and slow.
Conclusion
In order to understand if there ever was a digital revolution in the second half of the twentieth century, this paper examined two other ICT Revolutions — crafting a revolution assessment framework, helping to differentiate revolutions from evolutions or even emergences. The framework contained three criteria an ICT revolution has to fulfill in order to qualify. The first was speed: as Kovarik (2016) stated, revolutions are rapid. The second qualification is societal restructuring — truly causing a rupture or drastic change in current systems, not only upgrading what already exists. The third was universal impact, ensuring the revolution actually changed the world for everyone, not just a select few or the West. Using these three criteria revealed that neither the printing press, the telegraph, the telephone, nor the digital revolution truly qualify for revolution status. They might have introduced significant change to the world, changing the way we live today — but most of these changes were improvements or upgrades. The analysis shows that the digital revolution was neither quick enough, nor did the impact change something systematically. It was adopted by the system and didn't rupture it, concluding that the digital revolution was not a revolution in full — following evolutionary development, like many ICT 'Revolutions' before it.
References
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Bourdon, J. (2018). One tweet does not a revolution make: Technological determinism, media, and social change. In D. Park, N. Jankowski, & S. Jones (Eds.), The long history of new media: Technology, historiography, and contextualizing newness (pp. 237–248). Peter Lang.
Czitrom, D. J. (1982). Media and the American mind: From Morse to McLuhan. University of North Carolina Press.
Hirst, M. (2012). One tweet does not a revolution make: Technological determinism, media and social change. Massey University.
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